Requirement

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Chief, St/I/R
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THRU: Chief, D/S
Chief, S/TF

20 November 1957

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Additional Requirements for Source

In response to your request for further specific questions for source of the source of

- 1. Can source expand on statement that "when there is a flurry of transfer, the thing to look for is a sale of Russian gold?" Is the market for transferable sterling so thin that, for example, a Russian sale of \$10,000,000 or less could be detected? If so, what would be recommended as the best way to keep abreast of Soviet gold sales by amounts, dates, countries, etc?
- 2. What size bars are most readily saleable in international markets? Are the Soviet bars almost always remeited into smaller bars?
- 3. It is reasonable to assume that Soviet foreign exchange reserves are kept at so low a level (for fear of foreign devaluations, blocked accounts etc.) that any umplanned drain (credits, import surpluses) will necessitate a substantial sale of gold.
- 4. Are price considerations the primary motivation for shifts of Soviet gold sales from Switzerland to the UK; from transferable sterling to dollars. If not, what are the other considerations.
- 5. On the question of western credits, a Hungarian official stated that Hungary's commercial debts to the West at the time of the revolt amounted to approximately \$250 million. Could source comment on how Hungary was able to accumulate such a large commercial debt?

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